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Tort Reform Policy More Than State Law Dominates
Section 2 of the Third Restatement
Andrew F. Popper

Good afternoon, or "May it please the
Court," as it were. Following up on the last
i
presentation, I join my colleague Jerry Palmer
in expressing concern about the Restatement
and agree that the Black & Decker case 2 is evidence of the harsh impact of the inflexible alternative design requirement expressed in section
2. Mr. Palmer provided a graphic in which he
demonstrated how the alternative design
requirement will become a filter for a broad
range of tort actions, beyond strict liability for
design defect.3 In antitrust parlance, the effect
of this requirement would be referred to as a
bottleneck, a point through which all injured
and aggrieved consumers must pass.
The problem with any bottleneck is that the
entity that controls (or in this case defines) the
terms for access through this essential portal
has enormous power. Power refers to the role
played by the Restatement and the ALl regarding the redefinition of the parameters of tort litigation. The Restatement forces us to ask the
following question: Was the law in the United
States to the effect that no tort action focused
on defect can go forward unless the reporters
vision of alternative design is satisfied? The
answer is NO! That may be the perspective of
those who seek to limit all civil liability under
the banner of tort reform, but it is not substantiated in the case law.
Responding to this charge, we are told that
the instructions given to juries already reflect
the broad meaning of section 2 and that jurors
will see the Restatement's mandatory alternative design requirement as part of a generalized

risk/utility test, the dominant measure of defect.
This is sophistry; the plain meaning of the
Restatement would not permit defect to be
established by showing that the risk of a product outweighs its benefit. The plain meaning is
that the plaintiff will be required to concoct an
alternative design - and that drives a stake
through the heart of current product liability
law.
Before I launch into my nine-and-a-half
remaining minutes, let me just throw some
technologies out for our reporters: sodium pentasulfide, asbestos, TCE's and similar toxins.
In these areas, no plaintiff is going to be able to
generate an alternative design. Does that mean
we no longer have strict liability for dangerous
chemicals? Even if alternatives could be produced, the cost of alternative design is fiscally
prohibitive for the vast majority of plaintiffs.
When I look at these fields, the bottleneck
becomes smaller, and fewer and fewer plaintiffs
will be able to pass through.
On a more general level, I've been struggling with this Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability. It is not that it is difficult to
understand. In fact, it is rather magnificent in
terms of its clarity and coherence; the reporters
are to be commended for that. My broad issues
involve several other points.
First, as a legal academic, I face a problem
generated by all Restatements. Law professors
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have an obligation to maintain a learning environment in which doctrine is questioned, in
which uncertainty is a constant. We teach our
students that clients seek out thoughtful, competent, creative lawyers because law is more of
an art than a science and that every situation
can be seen from multiple perspectives.
Uncertainty in fact and uncertainty in law are
part of what we deal with.
The Restatement provides a momentary
and illusory relief from uncertainty, and I find
that troubling. Consider this: Does anyone
doubt the popularity of a law professor who
enters the classroom with a stated goal of
telling students the 'skinny,' the 'real dope,' the
law 'as it actually is'? The heck with that common law business. Here is a person who dishes up the hidden truth. To students, this professor is a hero. Sadly, such professors mislead
students into a world where law is linear and
reasoning is doctrinal. And you, as judges and
lawyers, know that characterization is just not
so.
Second, and more troubling, are the more
delicate questions that came up in Jerry
Palmer's presentation and also in the presentation in the first part of this program by the
reporters. In this Restatement there is a defining moment: the selection of an inflexible alternative design requirement for defect cases outside of a tiny and exceptional group of overt
and unconscionably defective goods. The
reporters may not want this to be the legacy of
the Restatement, perhaps because the standard
is one that can only be seen as defendant centered. To be sure, there are creative and proplaintiff components in other parts of this
Restatement, but the crystal and transformative
declaration by which this Restatement will be
judged is in its choice of this bottleneck. By

that selection, this becomes a tool of tort
reform.
When I was preparing for this program,
like many of you, I heard about the death of Al
Campanis. He was an unusual man who Walter
Alston said had taught him everything he needed to know about baseball. Yet every obituary
I read, everything I heard about Al Campanis,
began with a tragic moment in 1987 when he
made a blatantly racist remark on television,
was immediately fired by the Dodgers and was
thereafter, forever, marked. 4 As in biology,
sometimes a single event labels or reveals the
identifying trait. Is this the fate of this
Restatement? When you choose something of
this force and this magnitude that affects cases
in such a profound way, it is inevitable that it
will be the symbol by which the document is
branded.
The Restatement is not just a text to aid
judges. Law students place great stock in these
publications. What should I advise my students
this fall? I teach torts. What am I going to say
to them about the Third Restatement? Should I
tell them that it is a fair statement of the law?
Should I tell them that it is a strained reconfiguration of law? I will inform them that sometimes the ALI sets forth propositions and qualifies them by inviting the states to take a leap,
to move forward and consider the innovation
proposed. Other times, the Restatement purports to restate a general and agreed upon interpretation of the common law, as it has done
with the alternative design, requirement.
Should I tell them that this is the law? Should
I tell them that the drafters wrote it because
they were expressing their hope, the 'best way'
as they saw it?

Popper

What I am going to do is tell my students
to go to the law library, use Westlaw, use Lexis,
and find out for themselves. Here is my guess
about what my students are going to say.
Contrary to the Restatement, they are
going to find that Sternhagen5 case in Montana
and the Potter6 case in Connecticut are not
aberrant. They are going to conclude, when
they look state by state, that there is no consensus in terms of what design defect means, that
there is an intricate, important, confusing tapestry of design defect law that involves consumer
expectations, not trivialized the way they were
in the first section of this program, but talked
about broadly and in compassionate terms.
They are going to find risk-utility, which they
will come to call the Wade Seven Test (for
which they will develop confusing acronyms),
as having many, many different meanings in
different states. They are going to find alternative design among those factors, but they will
find that it is not a mandatory requirement in
7
the majority of states.
At this point, I imagine a discussion will
follow in my class. Students will ask one
another and me, why the Restatement has
focused on this singular requirement. Why is it
in the Restatement? I will tell them that, personally, I do not know what went on at the
American Law Institute. I'm not part of that
inner room, that sanctum sanctorum of legal
profession.
I only know that the outcome, the selection
of this singular criteria, was never part of the
advocacy of those who argue on behalf of
injured consumers. It was never part of the
agenda of those who argue on behalf of
women's rights. It was never part of the strategy of those who sought to tear the cloak off of

the asbestos and tobacco industries. It was
never part of the agenda of the consumer
movement. That I know.
I will refer them to a new law review
industry; there are scores of professors and
attorneys trying to understand, comment on,
and deconstruct the Restatement. It is really
quite something.
The reporters of the
Restatement have already produced two
lengthy pieces. One of them was just distributed. It is a defense of their work, refuting the
charge that the Restatement is a reflection of the
tort reform agenda.8 Other authors have
attacked the work, as I have done today.
Professors Frank Vandall, 9 Marshall Shapo,10
Jerry Phillips, 1 Ellen Werthheimer, 12 and
Howard Klemme 13 have produced articles saying that the Restatement is flawed. Professor
Vandall contends that the election of 'alternative design' is "not accurate." 14 Klemme says
15
that it is a "substantial misrepresentation."'
This is serious criticism in this community.
Some of this criticism, however, misses the
point. With all due deference to public choice
theory, imagine the innocent consumer who
acquired a product and is thereafter injured or
killed, who used the product in a foreseeable
way, who with reasonable inquiry and inspection could not have anticipated the harm, who
learns that in order to prevail in such a situation
that a person will have to build a better mousetrap. Through this scenario, the consumer will
learn that there is no expectation that a product
will perform safely - if the Third Restatement
law is applied.
One defense of the Restatement is that it
does not require, by its very text, the production
of an alternative design. Frankly, that is precisely what the text requires. Further, what is a

Tort Reform Policy

jury going to think when the state jury instructions are modified to conform with the
Restatement and they are given the language of
section 2? It does mean building a better
mousetrap. It does force the plaintiff to become
an expert in the technology that caused the
plaintiff's injury and redo the product. That is
what is required.
A few months ago, Professor Rebecca
Korzec wrote an article in the Boston College of
16
International and Comparative Law Review
examining the European product liability directive. The directive selects consumer expectation as the singular test, the only fair and rational means to undertake an analysis of what a
defect is. Now, we all understand that the
directives have a different meaning in Europe
than in the United States because of the variation in the legal systems. Even with that qualification, we do know that this directive represents their best thinking.
Consumer expectation also represents the
best thinking of a number of American courts,
and it is trashed by the Third Restatement.
Korzec notes, "The abandonment of consumer
expectation may be shortsighted and imprudent."' 17 Ellen Wertheimer likewise notes,
"One is forced to conclude [that] the Third
Restatement is a mistake, doctrinally and practically. It does not, cannot set forth a consensus
... for there is none." I8 Wertheimer concludes,
"[t]he Third Restatement makes one thing perfectly clear: The drafting process followed [by
the ALI] is a political one." 19
I don't know if that is true. The point of
the matter is that there was a substantive choice
made. If it is wrong, you are the group that
needs to take action.

This is the definitional moment of the
Restatement. No one is seriously debating
manufacturing defect. No one is questioning
what to do with putrid food or misproduced
items. These are not matters of controversy.
Controversy happens when you deal with a
product that is made by a company that is not
negligent and the product ends up killing people, and there is no readily available alternative,
or the cost of producing an available alternative
is prohibitive. In that area the Restatement fails
you, as judges, and, more importantly, fails the
public.
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